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Abstract. Voting rules aggregate multiple individual preferences in or-
der to make a collective decision. Commonly, these mechanisms are ex-
pected to respect a multitude of different notions of fairness and relia-
bility, which must be carefully balanced to avoid inconsistencies.
We present an approach for the sound and flexible design of voting rules
from composable modules. Formal composition rules guarantee social
choice properties from properties of the individual components. The ap-
proach can be applied to many voting rules from the literature.
Keywords: Social choice · Formal correctness · Modular design.
1 Introduction
In an election, voters cast ballots to express individual preferences about eligible
alternatives. From these preferences, a collective decision, i.e., a set of elected al-
ternatives, is determined using a voting rule. Voting rules are commonly designed
to meet various expectations for fairness and reliability, but no one general rule
caters for every requirement, and every rule shows paradoxical behavior for some
situation [1]. The axiomatic method permits the analysis of desired behavior by
comparing and characterizing voting rules via rigorous guarantees in the form
of formal properties. Designing voting rules towards such properties is generally
challenging as their trade-off is inherently difficult and error-prone.
Contribution. We present an approach for the systematic and formal design of
voting rules from compact composable modules with formal properties guaran-
teed by construction. This work gives the core component type and compositional
structures, e.g., for sequential, parallel and loop composition, and illustrates how
composition rules formally establish common social choice properties.
2 Property-Oriented Composition of Voting Rules
Electoral Modules. The foundation of our approach are electoral modules,
a generalization of voting rules. Voting rules elect a set of alternatives from a
profile, i.e., a sequence of ranked ballots, and a nonempty set of alternatives A.
Electoral modules are more general as they do not need to make final decisions,
but instead partition A into elected, rejected and deferred alternatives. Hence,
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if an electoral module always produces a nonempty set of elected alternatives
Aelected , it directly induces a voting rule which elects Aelected .
Compositional Structures. Our approach’s core structures are sequential,
parallel and loop composition, as well as the revision of decisions by prior mod-
ules. When composing two electoral modules m . n sequentially, the second
module n only decides on alternatives which m defers and cannot reduce the
alternatives already elected or rejected. A parallel composition m||an delegates
the two set-triples of m and n to an aggregator a, another component type which
combines two such triples into one triple. Moreover, we may revise choices from
prior modules and defer them for further decisions using a revision structure ↓.
Finally, a loop composition m 	t reiterates a module m sequentially until either
m’s iteration reaches a fixed point, or a termination condition t holds, i.e., a
component type which is simply a predicate on a triple of sets of alternatives.
A Simple Example. The well-known Baldwin’s rule [2] can be sequentially
composed with a loop structure of a module eliminating the alternative with the
lowest Borda score and terminating when only one alternative remains, and a
module which elects all deferred alternatives. This construction directly estab-
lishes, e.g., the Pareto property and Condorcet consistency as the loop may never
reject a Condorcet winner and always rejects Pareto-dominated alternatives.
3 Related Work, Conclusion and Outlook
Related Work. Our electoral modules are based on less-formal components for
hierarchical electoral systems from [4]. Other work designs voting rules less mod-
ularly for statistically guaranteeing social choice properties by machine learn-
ing [7]. Prior modular approaches target verification [5] or declarative combina-
tions of voting rules [3], but ignore social choice properties. Specific compositional
structures as presented in [6] are readily expressible by our structures.
Conclusion. Our approach enables flexible and intuitive compositions of voting
rules from a small number of structures with precise and general interfaces, easily
extended with further modules. This allows to formally establish common social
choice properties from given component properties by rigorous composition rules.
Outlook. A formally verified application of our approach is underway.
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